Air Force Inspector General Releases Report on Discord Leaks
The report finds unit members’ intentional failure to report security concerns and the unit’s poor culture regarding the security of classified information were primary contributing factors to the leaks.
Published by The Lawfare Institute
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On Dec. 11, the Inspector General of the Department of the Air Force released a report on the unauthorized disclosure of classified information by Airman First Class Jack D. Teixeira of the Massachusetts Air National Guard’s 102nd Intelligence Wing (102 IW) in what is commonly known as the “Discord Leaks.” Teixeira was charged by the Justice Department in April for allegedly sharing rewritten paragraphs of classified text and photos of classified documents in online chat groups on the platform Discord.
The report assesses Teixeira’s alleged actions as the primary cause of the leaks, but listed a number of additional contributing factors.
According to the report, the primary contributing factor to the leaks was unit members’ intentional failure to report security concerns and incidents of improper behavior by Teixeira for fear of overreaction by security officials. Most notably, three members of Teixeira’s unit knew of four instances––three of which were documented––where Teixeira had improperly handled or searched for classified material. The report states that had unit members reported these instances to the proper officials, the amount of leaked information could have been greatly reduced.
The investigation found the 102 IW had a lackluster culture regarding the security of classified information. Commanders put little effort into information security, were not vigilant in monitoring the behavior of unit members, and unit members allegedly did not care about information security.
The report also lists a number of indirect issues that contributed to the leaks. According to the report, inconsistent security reporting guidance in Defense Department and Air Force manuals, a conflation of classified system access and the “Need to Know” principle, differences in the disciplinary process between federal and state unit members, lack of supervision of night shift operations, and negative factors discovered in Teixeira’s security investigation not being shared with unit members all contributed to the leaks.
You can read the report here or below:
